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THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE lObis OF THE PARIS
CONVENTION ON AMERICAN UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
Patricia V. Norton
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the law of unfair competition attempts, in part,
to ensure free competition while protecting trademark owners'
goodwill and preventing consumer confusion. Federal and state
statutes incorporate the broad unfair competition law that has
developed in the United States. The Trademark Act of 1946
("Lanham Act"),' a federal statute, unified the common law of unfair
competition.2 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects against forms
of unfair competition, such as likelihood of confusion,
misrepresentation, and misappropriation?
The Lanham Act, through section 44, also incorporates
international agreements involving trademark law to which the
United States is a signatory nation.' One such agreement is the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.5 Signatory
nations attempted to devise international legal protection for the
property of citizens of member nations. Article lObis of the Paris
Convention, an amendment, was subsequently drafted to afford
protection to member nations' citizens from unfair competition.6
Since that time, courts in the United States have devised different
interpretations of Article lObis's effect on the unfair competition
provisions of the Lanham Act.7 While these interpretations diverge
* This Note is dedicated to my parents, my sister and my grandparents. I would
also like to give special thanks to Kristin D. Kiehn for her insightful comments.
1. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1050-1127 (1994).
2- See Doris E. Long, Unfair Competition and the Lanham Act 2 (1993).
3. See id.
4. See 15 U.S.C § 1126 (section 44 of the Lanham Act). "The intent of this
chapter is... to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions
respecting trade-marks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between
the United States and foreign nations." Id § 1127 (section 45 of the Lanham Act).
5. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1583, translated in G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 17 (1968) [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
6. See id. art. 10bis.
7. See infra Part III.
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on several levels, the main controversy is whether Article lObis
through section 44 of the Lanham Act grants substantive rights or
merely reciprocal rights. If Article 10bis grants reciprocal rights, then
the Paris Convention affords citizens of signatory nations only the
rights that each signatory nation affords its citizens within its borders.
On the other hand, if the Paris Convention affords substantive
protections, then each signatory nation agrees, at a minimum, to
protect against unfair competition as defined by the treaty, not as
defined by each individual country's laws. Under the latter
interpretation, the Paris Convention may actually expand the
protections against unfair competition that some foreign plaintiffs
receive in signatory nations' courts.8 Furthermore, as more cases
involving international trademark disputes arise, a definitive unitary
interpretation of Article 10bis becomes even more important in order
to determine whether plaintiffs are afforded different levels of
protections based on the country in which they find themselves.
In 1998, the District Court of New Jersey interpreted section 44 of
the Lanham Act and Article 10bis of the Paris Convention under the
reciprocal rights approach.9 The court held that section 44 of the
Lanham Act does not allow an American plaintiff to invoke the Paris
Convention's unfair competition prohibitions in order to sue a foreign
defendant for acts that are not actionable under American law.10
Other courts, however, have concluded that the Lanham Act
incorporates Article lObis's broad prohibitions against unfair
competition."
This Note analyzes these disparate results and addresses whether
section 44 of the Lanham Act incorporates the Paris Convention's
substantive prohibitions against unfair competition. Part I of this
Note outlines sections 43(a) and 44 of the Lanham Act, and the
legislative intent behind these provisions. Part II addresses how
treaties become law in the United States. It then describes the Paris
8. The phrase "may actually expand" is critical to understanding the premise of
this Note. This Note contends that Article 10bis is both a substantive provision and a
reciprocal rights provision. Under this theory, if a member country affords less
protection than is granted by the Paris Convention, then as a signatory nation that
country promises to protect citizens of other signatory nations from the unfair
competition as defined by Article 10bis. In such a country, Article lObis is a
substantive provision. In this situation, the citizens of other signatory nations would
actually have more protections in a court in that nation than its own citizens would
receive. However, if the country affords more protections than those provided by
Article 10bis, then that country promises to afford citizens of other signatory nations
the same rights as it affords its own citizens. Thus, in this situation, Article lObis
guarantees equal (reciprocal) rights for citizens of signatory nations. See 4 J. Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 29:25 (4th ed. 1999).
9. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 1998); see also
infra Part III.A (discussing the reciprocal rights approach).
10. See Eli Lilly, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
11. See infra Part III.B (discussing the substantive rights approach).
[Vol. 68
1999] ARTICLE lObis OF THE PARIS CONVENTION 227
Convention, the enactment of Article lObis, and how the United
States generally interprets such a treaty. Part I analyzes courts'
diverging interpretations of Article 10bis and section 44. This part
compares the reciprocal rights approach as adopted by the Second
Circuit in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co.,'2 as well as its
interpretations of section 44 of the Lanham Act and Article lObis of
the Paris Convention, with the approach adopted by the Eastern
District of Michigan in General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de
Arriortua.13 Part IV argues that American courts should interpret the
Paris Convention as adopting the European definition of substantive
rights and protections against unfair competition as enunciated in
Article 10bis. Furthermore, because Article lObis protects only
member nations' citizens on foreign soil from acts the Convention
deems to be unfair, Americans can use the Paris Convention as their
source of protection only from acts of unfair competition by citizens of
other member nations, not from acts by fellow Americans. This Note
argues that because Article 10bis affords greater protection then does
the Lanham Act, there is a disparity in the protections afforded from
unfair competition in American courts.'4 To avoid situations, in which
American courts would enforce different rights for different parties
depending on their citizenship, this Note advocates that Congress
should adopt Article 10bis as the definition for all disputes, not just
for cases involving citizens of Convention nations.
I. SECTIONS 43(a) AND 44 OF THE LANHAM ACT
Prior to 1946, unfair competition law was effectively absent from
federal statutes and was entirely a construction of the common law.' 5
Federal statutes prior to the Lanham Act viewed trademark law as
primarily a state concern and properly governed by common law.' 6
This led to a wide disparity of rights and protections for product
owners throughout the country.17  This disparity became more
noticeable as the volume of interstate commerce increased.'8 Along
with the disparity in protections afforded in the judicial setting, other
12. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
13. 948 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
14. See supra note 8.
15. For a discussion of the definition of unfair competition, see infra Part I.A.
16. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Harmonization: Norms, Names & Nonsense,
2 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 33, 34 (1998). Trademarks are used "to identify and
distinguish" goods of a producer. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
17. See Port, supra note 16, at 34.
18. If trademark law had remained only a state concern, then parties could have
potentially encountered fifty different laws on trademark. See id. Accordingly, as
markets expanded from local to national in scope, the potential to have problems due
to different states' laws increased as well. Thus, the government realized the
increasing necessity to enact a federal unitary law.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
problems stemming from the 190519 and 192020 acts led to the Lanham
Act's passage. These problems included: "a lack of substantive
protection for certain trademarks; inconsistent and limiting judicial
interpretations; limits on the scope of relief; and ambiguities in the
textual language. "21
In creating a uniform federal trademark law in the 1940s, "Congress
determined that 'a sound public policy requires that trademarks
should receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given
them." '22  The result of this determination is the Lanham Act, a
federal law "unify[ing] the common law of unfair competition and
trademark protection."'  The Lanham Act was enacted in broad
rather than constricting language in order to eliminate the limits on
the scope of relief.24
Because Congress drafted the Act broadly and did not outline the
explicit goals of each section, Congress established an overall purpose
to which courts could aspire when hearing a case. Section 45 of the
Lanham Act reflected this purpose,' and was intended to give the
judiciary flexibility in affording justice while maintaining a minimum
standard of protection for trademark owners. Section 45 states that
"[t]he intent of this chapter is to... mak[e] actionable the deceptive
and misleading use of marks[;] ... to protect persons engaged in...
commerce against unfair competition; [and] to prevent fraud and
deception... by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or
colorable imitations of registered marks ....
While the Lanham Act eliminated the problems created by differing
levels of protection afforded by the states, this was not the Act's sole
purpose." The Act, through section 45, focuses primarily on
protecting both the consumer public and trademark owners.2" The
Lanham Act achieves these purposes by securing the owner's
19. See Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 724, repealed by
Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427.
20. See Act of Mar. 19, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-163, 41 Stat. 533, repealed by
Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427.
21. See Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should Be
the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 671, 679 (1984).
22. Port, supra note 16, at 34.
23. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 846 n.2 (1982); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 76-944 at 4 (1939) (stating that trademarks are no longer just a local
concern but a national concern because of the need to secure rights for trademark
owners involved in interstate commerce).
24. See Bauer, supra note 21, at 679-81.
25. See id. at 692.
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
27. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1276-77;
Jerold A. Jacover & Kathleen E. Brennan, Trade Dress and Product Configuration
Law, in Protecting Trade Dress 21, 23 (Robert C. Dorr & Christopher H. Munch eds.,
1992).
28. See Lori L. Bean, Note, Ambush Marketing: Sports Sponsorship Confilsion
and the Lanham Act, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1099, 1111 (1995).
[Vol. 68
1999] ARTICLE lObis OF THE PARIS CONVENTION 229
goodwill, banning commercial misrepresentation and preventing
consumer confusion. 9 Because these concepts may at times conflict
with one another, courts must weigh each concept in reaching their
decision, ultimately deciding a case by "universal concepts of
justice."3 This emphasis on just treatment is indicative of trademark
law's approach toward unfair competition: the three factors are not an
exact science, but rather are used as a guide in reaching a just
resolution.31 Likewise, the primary premise behind the Lanham Act is
to afford relief in cases where the denial of protection would lead to
an unjust outcome.32
To achieve this balanced approach, Congress enacted section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act in broad terms in order to provide uniform
protection from unfair competition to all American trademark
owners 3 Additionally, just as Congress saw the necessity of creating
uniform national protection in the 1940s due to the increase in
interstate commerce, Congress foresaw that more international
protections in trademark law might be created through treaties. 3
Thus, Congress enacted section 44 to give effect to international
conventions affecting American trademark law.35 This part briefly
examines the common law definition of unfair competition and
outlines section 43(a)'s definition of unfair competition and the
legislative intent behind the section. It then analyzes section 44's
integration of international conventions within American borders, as
well as the legislative intent behind this provision.
A. Unfair Competition
Courts have continually grappled with defining unfair competition
precisely,3 6 often invoking such vague terms as "fair play" and
"honesty."s As one court noted, "[u]nfair competition is not a tort
with specific elements; it describes a general category of torts which
29. See Steven M. Auvil, Gray Market Goods Produced by Foreign Affiliates of
the U.S. Trademark Owner: Should the Lanham Act Provide a Remedy?, 28 Akron L
Rev. 437, 447 (1995); see generally McCarthy, supra note 8, ch. 23 (discussing the
elements of likelihood of confusion).




34. See Walter J. Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the
First Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1029,
1037-39 (1957).
35. See McCarthy, supra note 8, § 2:2.
36. See generally id. § 1:9 (elaborating on the difficulty of defining unfair
competition).
37. See Johnson & Johnson v. Quality Pure Mfg., 484 F. Supp. 975, 979 (D.NJ.
1979) (discussing boundaries of fair play in competition); Pennwalt Corp. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 434 F. Supp. 758, 763-65 (D.NJ. 1977) (discussing the element of
fair dealing in competition).
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courts recognize for the protection of commercial interests. '38
Because recognizing unfair competition is not a completely objective
exercise, courts and scholars alike have failed to give it precise
meaning. A court's analysis of an alleged unfair act often involves
determining whether the defendant has "played too hard" or
"competed too hard. '39 Unfortunately, these metaphorical phrases
offer little objective guidance in determining the existence of unfair
competition, and lead to a judge's subjective analysis bordering on "I
know it when I see it."40
While such judicial definitions may be vague and expansive, too
precise a definition would not be useful. For example, if the United
States attempted to set strict parameters on the scope of unfair
competition, the definition might not encompass the ingenious actions
of those who did compete unfairly.41 In fact, the California Court of
Appeals stated that "it would be impossible to draft in advance
detailed plans and specifications of all acts and conduct to be
prohibited... , since unfair or fraudulent business practices may run
the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery. 4 2  Thus, a flexible
definition of unfair competition is more useful because it actually
allows courts to weigh competing interests and to determine a fair
outcome.
43
Congress, realizing the greater benefits afforded by a broad
definition, drafted section 43(a) to encompass all acts likely to cause
unfair competition." Because this definition has been applied by
38. Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v. Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987).
39. See McCarthy, supra note 8, § 1:8.
40. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(explaining the difficulty in defining hard-core pornography); see also McCarthy,
supra note 8, § 1:9 (concluding that courts often explain unfair competition in a
similar fashion to Justice Stewart's famous quote and thus the courts' conclusions
offer "little guidance or predictability").
41. The Supreme Court's definition, in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), exemplifies how a concrete definition is also not necessarily
useful. The majority stated: "The law of unfair competition has its roots in the
common law tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers from
confusion as to source." See id. at 157. Because the definition was narrowly construed
to include only confusion of a product's source, it left other forms of unfair
competition, such as false advertising and dilution, out of the definition. See
McCarthy, supra note 8, § 1:9.
42. People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co. of Ca., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521
(1962) (citations omitted).
43. See McCarthy, supra note 8, § 1:13.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994) states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
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courts for the past fifty years,45 there are a wide variety of acts that
courts have deemed unfair under this definition including:
infringement of a trademark, dilution, misappropriation, false
representations, and passing off.4 Thus, while section 43(a)'s
expansive definition may be too broad to offer much guidance on its
own, the definition combined with these concrete examples creates
more definitive parameters to measure alleged acts of unfair
competition against.47
B. Section 43(a)
As noted above, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides broad
federal statutory protection against unfair competition by both
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged
by such act.
See id
45. Section 43(a) has been amended since enactment. Due to the absence of
legislative history, the law surrounding section 43(a) has developed mainly through
courts' interpretations of the provision. See infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text
(discussing the effects of the absence of legislative comment on section 43(a)). This
absence "has resulted in expansion of the law of unfair competition into areas not
previously envisioned by Congress." Gregory L Pehlman, Note, Unfair Competition-
Infringement Claims Under the Lanhanz Act-Relaxed Standards for Protection of
Distinctive Trade Dress, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 449, 453 (1993). The Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988 incorporated this judicial expansion into section 43(a). See
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100667, 102 Stat. 3935. Congress
intended the revised section 43(a) to "codify the interpretation [section 43(a)] has
been given by courts." See H.R. Rep. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988).
46. Passing off is the substitution of a product for another seller's product. See
McCarthy, supra note 8, § 25:1. For court cases holding that the listed acts fall under
section 43(a), see American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1926)
(discussing passing off); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918) (holding INS had "quasi-property rights in news" gathered by INS and thus
Associated Press had misappropriated such news); Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. Majestic
Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1992) (analyzing whether the spelling of whisky
could represent the geographical origin of a product); Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l
Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that trademark infringement is a
tort); Ameritech, Inc. v. American Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1987)
(describing effects of dilution of trademark). For more examples, see McCarthy,
supra note 8, § 1:10. These examples should be used as a guide when analyzing unfair
competition, not as a list of the only forms of unfair competition against which the
laws protect.
47. However, because these examples are just guidelines, courts are not required
to follow them. Thus, although there is a certain amount of assurance in these
examples, due to the flexible nature of unfair competition law, an analysis should not
examine whether an act fits into a pre-established category and then end its analysis
there. Rather, a court should analyze the alleged act in the abstract as well to
determine whether it is the type of action section 43(a) was drafted to protect against.
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codifying and expanding common law restrictions. 48 Unfortunately,
while Congress drafted a uniform national law, Congress did not give
the interpreters of section 43(a) much guidance. Courts and scholars
alike have noted that section 43(a) is marked by a lack of legislative
history and comment.49 In fact, the Second Circuit has stated that
although the legislative history of the Lanham Act as a whole was
generally "long and convoluted," the legislative history surrounding
section 43(a) was "inconclusive and therefore of little or no help."50
The Second Circuit concluded that section 45's general purpose of
affording protection against unfair competition should apply to
section 43 of the Lanham Act.5 1
This lack of legislative history has left courts little to examine when
interpreting the section but the words of the section itself. Some
scholars contend that because Congress did not focus on section 43(a),
thus leaving the intent behind the provision ambiguous, courts should
analyze section 43(a) in the dual contexts of the Lanham Act as a
whole and of the acts it was replacing. One scholar, in particular,
advocated analyzing section 43(a) "based on the 25 years of
development of the language which eventually was incorporated into
section 43(a), and on its historical setting-restrictive judicial
decisions, expanded international trade, and treaty obligations. '53
Other commentators noted that section 43(a) included only three
changes from the 1920 act that the Lanham Act replaced.-, These
differences included: (1) the broadening of the scope of the section to
include false designation of origin or any false descriptions or
representations; (2) the inclusion of protection for both goods and
services; and (3) that the "elements of willfulness and intent were no
longer required to support a claim of relief."55 These differences and
48. See Ethan G. Zlotchew, "Scandalous" or "Disparaging"? It Should Make a
Difference in Opposition and Cancellations Actions, 22 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 217,
221 (1998). The Lanham Act expands the protections in several ways. First, the Act
protects "not only trademarks, but also ... service marks." See id. Additionally, the
Lanham Act has no requisite intent. Rather, the plaintiff must show only similarity of
any symbol to its own mark. See id. Finally, if a plaintiff registers a mark, the
registration is prima facie evidence of the plaintiff's ownership. See id.
49. See, e.g., Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 689-90 (2d Cir.
1971) (concluding that the legislative history of section 43(a) was not helpful);
Derenberg, supra note 34, at 1037-39 (noting that the legislative history of section
43(a) was quite brief).
50. Colligan, 442 F.2d at 689-90 (citation omitted).
51. See id. at 692. Section 45 states that the purpose of the Lanham Act is "to
protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition." 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (1994).
52. See Derenberg, supra note 34, at 1037-39; supra note 18 and accompanying
text (discussing the 1905 act); see also supra note 19 (discussing the 1920 act).
53. See Bauer, supra note 21, at 681.
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the historical setting have led to the conclusion that the drafters did
intend to expand protections afforded to trademark owners.
Unfortunately, despite section 43(a)'s broad language, many
courts were cautious in implementing the protections afforded to
plaintiffs from trademark infringement under this section. s Courts
tended to limit claims plaintiffs were allowed to bring as well as the
relief granted under section 43(a).59 Early in the Act's history, many
courts interpreted the Lanham Act as only codifying existing common
law,' rather than substantively adding any new protections or
prohibitions.6' Indeed, one scholar argued that the section should not
be liberally construed as a "catch-all for all forms of unfair
competition," but instead interpreted as only "directly concerned with
the sale of goods or services. '
Additionally, as a result of the lack of legislative guidance, courts
initially often depended on pre-existing common law to interpret the
section.61 Many judicial decisions based on the nineteenth-century
common law conception of unfair competition narrowly defined
actionable conduct, and thus limited prospective challengers to only a
few recognized unfair practices. 64 On the other hand, some courts did
afford expanded protection, thus creating a large disparity in the
remedies available to owners in different states.P Thus, while section
43(a) was enacted in part to unify unfair competition law throughout
the country, courts were unsure of their proper focus due to the lack
of legislative commentary when deciding a case. This absence of
legislative guidance ironically created disparities similar to those the
Lanham Act was intended to remedy.
Finally, in 1954, the Third Circuit discarded the limits courts had
previously placed on the language of section 43(a). 66 In L'Aiglon
Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., the court abandoned the notion
that a plaintiff must prove "passing off" in order to prove a false
advertising claim.67 Although some courts subsequently rejected the
Third Circuit's view, other courts did follow suit. For example, the
D.C. Circuit held that "Section 43(a) does create a federal statutory
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Long, supra note 2, at 15.
59. See, e.g., Long, supra note 2, at 11 & n.41 (citing cases from the Second and
Seventh Circuits as well as several district courts).
60. See McCarthy, supra note 8, § 27:8.
61. See id. chs. 4-5 (noting that courts continued to require the common law
element of "passing off" in order to be entitled to relief).
62. Derenberg, supra note 34, at 1039.
63. Sei Bauer, supra note 21, at 682-84.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 683-84.
66. See L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 649 (3d Cir.
1954).
67. See id. at 651; see also supra note 46 (defining passing or palming off).
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tort, sui generis .... 6,1 Finally, in 1982, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Lanham Act as governing all types of trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims.69  Thus, since the
section's creation, judicial protection afforded under section 43(a) has
been greatly expanded to provide protections more in line with the
intent of the drafters. 70
This is not to say that section 43(a) was enacted solely to unify
American trademark law. On the contrary, it was also enacted "to
bring American law into express conformity with the more liberal
principles of a number of foreign countries, standards to which the
United States had pledged adherence by treaty and convention."'" In
response to these international obligations, Congress drafted sections
43(a) and 44.
C. Section 44
Section 44 of the Lanham Act, entitled International Conventions,
addresses rights stipulated by international treaties and conventions to
which the United States is a signatory nation.72 Section 45, which
states the general purposes of the Lanham Act, declares that one
purpose of the Act is "to provide rights and remedies stipulated by
treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and
unfair competition entered into between the United States and
foreign nations."'73 To give effect to this purpose, section 44(b)
provides that "any person whose country of origin is a party to any
convention ... to which the United States is also a party.., shall be
entitled to the benefits of this section... to the extent necessary to
give effect to any provision of such convention. '74
To ensure that American citizens have the same rights as foreigners
under treaties to which the United States is a signatory nation,
Congress enacted section 44(i). This section affords American
citizens in litigation with any foreign parties any extra protections that
may have been afforded to such foreigners through treaties.75 Thus,
any additional rights afforded to citizens of member nations are only
afforded to Americans when they are in litigation with such member
nations' citizens. In fact, one Representative stated, "We have the
curious anomaly of this Government giving by treaty and by law with
68. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955), affd sub nom.
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
69. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 858-59 (1982).
70. The Lanham Act has been amended to incorporate these judicial
interpretations. See supra note 45 (discussing the 1988 amendment to the Lanham
Act).
71. Bauer, supra note 21, at 680.
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1994).
73. Id. § 1127.
74. Id. § 1126(b).
75. See id. § 1126.
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respect to trade-marks and unfair competition to nationals of foreign
governments greater rights than it gives its own citizens.... This
[subsection 44(i) in the final draft] is an attempt to put the citizen on
equality with the foreigner."76 Additionally, one court concluded that
Congress must have intended section 44 to incorporate all substantive
provisions of any trademark treaty to which the United States is a
signatory nation.7 The court reasoned that if section 44 did not fully
incorporate substantive provisions of such treaties, section 44(i) would
be superfluous because the subsection would never be used to grant
the same rights to American citizens.78
Congress arguably intended to define unfair competition more
broadly in section 44 of the Lanham Act than it was defined at
common law. Because section 44 gives effect to treaties, "it is a
wholly justifiable inference that the term 'unfair competition,' used in
a section designed 'to provide rights and remedies stipulated by
treaties and conventions respecting... unfair competition' was
intended by the draftsmen in its broader sense, as it is used in such
treaties and conventions."'79 In fact, in one draft of the Lanham Act,
one member of Congress proposed that section 44(g) state that "[a]ll
acts of unfair competition in commerce are declared to be
unlawful .... I Although Congress ultimately rejected this all-
inclusive definition of unfair competition, this does not mean that
Congress chose not to give full effect to any treaty that more broadly
defined unfair competition. In fact, section 44 uses the phrase
"effective protection against unfair competition."'" This phrase was
adopted from Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.m' Thus, while
Congress did not explicitly state that section 44 substantively
incorporates international treaties and conventions, the use of the
76. General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 689
(E.D. Mich. 1996) (alteration in the original) (quoting Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before
the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 164
(1939)).
77. See id
78. See id Additionally, in United States v. Menasche, the Supreme Court held
that a court must interpret a statute in a way that gives effect to all of its provisions.
See 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
79. Rudolph Callmann, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and
Monopolies § 2.06 (4th ed. 1997).
80. Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 690 (quoting Hearings on HR 4744 Before the
Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 164 (1939)).
Section 44(h) now states:
Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the
benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to
effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided in
this chapter for infringement of marks shall be available so far as they may
be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition.
15 U.S.C. § 1126(g) (1994).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h).
82. See David B. Wolf, "Effective Protection Against Unfair Competition" Under
Section 44 of the Lanham Act, 82 Trademark Rep. 33, 55 (1992).
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phrase from the Paris Convention, an arguably substantive treaty,
implies that section 44 does not merely grant reciprocal rights, but
rather implements the substantive language of all trademark treaties.83
To determine exactly what the United States promised to protect
against, the next part examines the Paris Convention and the purposes
behind its unfair competition provision, Article 10bis.
II. THE EFFECT OF THE PARIS CONVENTION ON UNITED STATES
TRADEMARK LAW
The Paris Convention was originally adopted in 1883,84 and since
then, has been amended several times.8 5 Its primary purpose is to
create a set of unitary international standards for trademark, patent,
and unfair competition law. 6 Though the United States is a signatory
nation, whether the Paris Convention has any substantive effect on
American unfair competition law, or whether it grants only reciprocal
rights to members' citizens is difficult to determine. This part
explores how a treaty becomes law in the United States, and how
courts determine a treaty's effects on pre-existing law. It then
examines the Paris Convention in detail, including its purposes and
the intent behind its provisions, in particular Article 10bis.
A. How Treaties Become Law in the United States
Treaties are often characterized as "contracts between nations."'
Consequently, they are instruments that establish obligations in
accordance with international law with which countries, as parties to
such treaties, agree to comply.81 In the United States, treaties also
have the status of domestic law.89 The United States Constitution
considers a treaty entered into by the executive branch or Congress to
be the law of the land, subordinate only to the Constitution itselfY0
Thus, courts should consider a treaty or convention equal to acts of
Congress. 9'
Because treaty law and federal statutory law are considered equal,9
83. See id.
84. See Paris Convention, supra note 5.
85. The treaty was amended in Brussels in 1900, Washington in 1911, The Hague
in 1925, London in 1934, Lisbon in 1958, and Stockholm in 1967.
86. See McCarthy, supra note 8, § 29:25.
87. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals,
92 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1082 (1992).
88. See id.
89. See Hugh C. Thatcher, The Doctrine of Specialty, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.
1321, 1327 (1998).
90. See id.
91. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
92. See David M. Shamberger, Note, The Helms-Burton Act: A Legal and
Effective Vehicle for Redressing U.S. Property Claims in Cuba and Accelerating the
Demise of the Castro Regime, 21 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 497,535 n.297 (1998).
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neither should be given an advantage if a conflict exists. Instead,
courts must attempt to interpret the terms of each in order to avoid
conflict and hopefully to reconcile the differing doctrines.
Furthermore, if the two provisions cannot be reconciled, the statutory
law does not automatically override the treaty. In fact, the Supreme
Court has held that the last in time prevails. 4 Thus, a treaty could
conceivably supersede a previously-enacted statute.95
Unfortunately, courts are generally reluctant to substantively
uphold a treaty that is in conflict with statutory law.9 Furthermore,
because American courts ultimately decide the meaning of treaties,
they can be misinterpreted in order to uphold a statute.97
As with statutes, a court should attempt to determine a treaty's
purposes by examining its text and intent in the recorded history. 3
Unfortunately, courts are not as enthusiastic about interpreting
treaties as they are about interpreting statutes.99 Perhaps this is due to
the inherent complexity in intermingling the laws of several nations,
or to the fact that a treaty is not "born" in the same way as a statute.1°°
Additionally, "because treaty interpretation has both municipal and
international implications," American courts realize the need to take
into consideration the expectation of all signatory nations when
interpreting a treaty.101 Whatever the reason, courts often defer
interpretation to the branches that make treaties under American
law.102 Due to this tendency to avoid interpretation of treaties, courts
often stall the United States in its performance of its international
promises and obligations by declaring a treaty non-self-executing. 13
In the United States, Congress need not create a law giving effect to
a treaty if the treaty is self-executing. A treaty is "self-executing" if it
can be directly applied in domestic law at the moment of its adoption
93. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
94. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,194 (1888).
95. See Shamberger, supra note 92, at 535 n.297.
96. See generally Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Question": A
Response, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 524 (1987) (examining the relative priority of statutes
versus treaties in the context of the Chinese Exclusion Case).
97. See generally David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,
41 UCLA L. Rev. 953 (1994) (discussing treaty interpretation by United States
courts).
98. See Thatcher, supra note 89, at 1329.
99. See Bederman, supra note 97, at 954; see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 111 (1986) (stating that international
agreements are to be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the terms
considered in context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty).
100. See Bederman, supra note 97, at 954.
101. See id. at 956.
102. See id.
103. See James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation,
18 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1,13 n30 (1994).
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without an implementing statute °4  According to the Third
Restatement of Foreign Relations, a treaty is presumed to be self-
executing unless its language indicates that implementing legislation
will be necessary, Congress passes a resolution requiring
implementing legislation, or the United States Constitution requires
implementing legislation.10 5
As noted above, courts often attempt to give precedence to
statutory law over treaty law by declaring a treaty to be non-self-
executing."° In Foster v. Neilson, Chief Justice Marshall stated that
some treaties are addressed "to the political, not judicial department;
and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court."'1  This distinction in a treaty's mode of address is
a decisive factor in determining whether a treaty is self-executing.
Along with analyzing other factors, if a treaty's language squares
neatly with judicial application, 108 it is found to be self-executing, and
thus can be directly applied by the courts.
Some argue that the self-executing nature of a treaty can be
determined by identifying whom the treaty was enacted to affect. It is
frequently stated that treaties are enforceable by individuals in court
only when the treaty confers rights on those individuals. 109 In order
for courts to be able to give effect to a treaty, it must be directed at
the citizens of the United States, because "[t]he province of the court
is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals .... ,no Accordingly,
under this theory, courts can determine whether a treaty is self-
executing by determining whether the treaty creates privately
enforceable rights. 1' In order to make this determination, courts
104. In Davis v. Burke, the Supreme Court stated that:
A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a
sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and
protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced; and it is not self-executing
when it merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of
which those principles may be given the force of law.
179 U.S. 399,403 (1900).
105. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111
(1986).
106. See Wilets, supra note 103, at 1, 13 n.30.
107. 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
108. See John P. Donohue, Recent Case, 17 Suffolk Transnat'l. Rev. 298, 302
(1994).
109. See id.
110. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,169 (1803).
111. See Donohue, supra note 108, at 302. This view has been criticized. See id. See
also Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A
Critical Analysis, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 627, 637 (1986) (arguing that a treaty must be
determined to be self-executing before it can be analyzed to ascertain whether the
treaty confers any individual rights). Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States does not mention the creation of
privately enforceable rights in its requirements for self-executing treaties. Instead,
the Restatement presumes a treaty is self-executing unless the treaty's language
requires additional implementing legislation. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign
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must examine the language and the intent behind the treaty."2 This is
not an exact science, but rather is governed by general guidelines set
forth by scholars and conventions, such as the United Nations
International Law Commission, the International Court of Justice,
and the Permanent Court of International Justice.113
When a court interprets a treaty's purpose and effect, it should
properly consider the historical intent behind the treaty, both as a
whole and as to its separate provisions."4 The following section
explores the historical purposes of the Paris Convention as a basis for
interpreting Article 10bis.
B. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
The first meeting of the Paris Convention in 1883 attempted to
afford protection to industrial property"5 and to ensure uniform legal
consequences amongst all signatory nations."6 Since its enactment,
the Paris Convention has been revised to include various other
protections."7 Article 10bis, adopted as an amendment to the
Convention, is primarily concerned with ensuring effective protection
against unfair competition.
Article 10bis broadly defines unfair competition as "any act
contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters."'18
Unfair competition, as defined in the Paris Convention, expresses the
idea that a "particular act of competition is to be condemned as unfair
because it is inconsistent with currently accepted standards of honest
practice."" 9 Although the American law of unfair competition has
broadened to include tortious acts other than "passing off,"'" the use
in the Paris Convention of definitions that are more European and
thus broader tends to evidence the belief that the Convention should
be read to include the broader definitions used in Europe."'
Article 10bis is an extremely flexible provision as are European
unfair competition laws generally.'1 This flexibility is both an asset
and a drawback.lu Because the Paris Convention's definition of
Relations Law of the United States § 111 (1986).
112. See Donohue, supra note 108, at 302.
113. See Leigh Ann Kennedy, Case Note, Jurisdiction in Violation of an Ertradition
Treaty: United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 27 Creighton L. Rev. 1105, 1119 (1994).
114. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
115. See Paris Convention, supra note 5.
116. See Bodenhausen, supra note 5, at 7.
117. See Paris Convention, supra note 5, art. 10bis.
118. See id.
119. Callmann, supra note 79, § 26.10.
120. See supra note 45 (defining "passing off"); supra note 47 and accompanying
text (listing different illegal acts held to be within section 43(a)'s application).
121. See Bodenhausen, supra 5, at 7.




unfair competition does not provide a specific interpretive structure,
in some respects each country is able to use its own version of illegal
unfair competition law in suits involving at least one member nation's
citizen. This flexibility, however, does not mean that countries should
use only their own version of unfair competition in suits between their
citizens and other members' citizens. Rather, it means that, at a
minimum, countries must assure effective protection against unfair
competition as the Paris Convention defines it. 2 4 Because countries
may afford greater protection against unfair competition than
provided for in Article 10bis, member countries may have differing
standards of protection for unfair competition. Nevertheless, member
nations may not set a standard below the minimum set forth by the
Convention. lz5
In the United States, the federal standard is set forth by section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. Section 43(a) and Article 10bis contain
differing definitions of unfair competition. Section 43(a) is narrower
and based upon a showing of three specific elements: (1) the
"secondary meaning" of the trademark or its inherent distinctiveness;
(2) the non-functional nature of the copied features; and (3) the
resulting consumer confusion. 26 On the other hand, Article lObis's
definition is much broader, stating that any act that is contrary to
honest business practices is considered unfair competition a27 Thus, if
American courts confine the definition of unfair competition set forth
in Article 10bis within the parameters of section 43(a), they may
disregard the inherent minimum standard that signatory nations must
give the doctrine.1 8
While participating countries have agreed to protect citizens of
signatory nations from unfair competition as defined in Article lObis,
implementing the provision poses another issue. In order to give
effect to the Convention, some countries must first create laws
designed to enact the treaty's provisions.2 9 If the Convention is self-
executing, then its broad prohibitions would go into effect
automatically upon signing. Whether the Paris Convention is
self-executing depends upon the parties' intentions at the time of
negotiation. 30
There has been some debate over whether the Paris Convention is
self-executing. In 1889, Attorney General William H. H. Miller stated
that "each party to it covenants to grant in the future to the ...
124. See id.
125. See McCarthy, supra note 8, § 29:26.
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994); see also supra Part I.B (discussing section 43(a)).
127. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (discussing the traits of Article
10bis).
128. See Wolf, supra note 82, at 42.
129. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
130, See Wolf, supra note 82, at 55.
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citizens of other parties certain special rights[,]" and therefore the
Paris Convention is "not self-executing. 113' In 1938, however, the
Commissioner of Patents stated that though certain provisions of the
treaty were not self-executing, the proposed legislation (the Lanham
Act) would give effect to such provisions in the United States.'1
One commentator contends that Article 25 may evidence the theory
that the Paris Convention is not self-executing. 3 Article 25 of the
Convention states that "[a]ny country party to this Convention
undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution, the measures
necessary to ensure the application of this Convention."' This
provision may also have been enacted to ensure that each country
would implement laws giving effect to the Convention if the country
did not recognize the Convention's self-executing nature. This
commentator concluded that whether the treaty is self-executing
should not affect Congress's duty to implement the full Convention
pursuant to Article 25 of the Paris Convention.m Thus, even if the
Convention is not self-executing, the United States promised, as set
forth by Article 25 of the Convention, that if needed, it would enact
proper legislation to give effect to the Paris Convention. According to
this argument, section 44 of the Lanham Act would give effect to the
full provisions of the Paris Convention, including Article 1Obis.'
By creating Article 25 of the Paris Convention, the signatory
nations attempted to ensure that all signatory nations would enact
uniform protection. Unfortunately, the clarity of this purpose has
been subsequently tarnished by the contrasting definitions of unfair
competition in section 43(a) and Article lObis. The next part
examines how American courts have interpreted Article lObis of the
Paris Convention and section 44 of the Lanham Act.
M. A CONFLICT IN INTERPRETATION: DOES SECTION 44
INCORPORATE THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE lObis?
Although section 44 of the Lanham Act expressly incorporates
international treaties and conventions into American law,137 it is
unclear whether the section incorporates substantive or reciprocal
rights and whether the Paris Convention is based on substantive or
reciprocal rights. Courts are divided over whether Article lObis's
131. OG of U.S. Patent Office XLVII 937 (1889), quoted in Stephen P. Ladas,
Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights-National and International Protection § 130,
at 218 (1975).
132. See Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the House Comm. on Patents, Subcomm. on
Trade-Marks, 75th Cong. 195 (1938). H.R. 9041 was a bill that eventually led to the
enactment of the Lanham Act. See Wolf, supra note 82, at 35.
133. See Wolf, supra note 82, at 36 n.10.
134. See Paris Convention, supra note 5, art. 25.
135. See Wolf, supra note 82, at 49.
136. See supra Part I.C.
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1994).
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definition should be substantively adopted, or whether only reciprocal
rights should be granted. 138 Courts holding that only reciprocal rights
are afforded contend that the signatory nations did not intend to
create a new international trademark law.3 On the other hand, one
court held that the signatory nations did intend to create a substantive
uniform international protection for trademark owners from unfair
competition.140  This latter court asserts that the intent behind the
Paris Convention is to protect against unfair competition as defined in
Article 10bis, not as defined by each signatory nation . 41 This part
explores these differing interpretations of Article 10bis and section 44.
A. The Vanity Fair Approach
The more conservative approach toward interpreting section 44 and
the Paris Convention is typified by Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton
Co. 142 The main premise underlying this approach is that the legal
protections afforded by trademark law have their source in the
jurisdiction in which the alleged acts took place.143 Courts adopting
this national treatment approach interpret the Paris Convention as
extending the same rights to foreigners as the United States affords its
citizens. These courts, thus, read section 44 as granting only
reciprocal rights and not incorporating the broad substantive
prohibitions against unfair competition provided by Article lObis.
The first case to apply this reciprocal rights approach was L'Aiglon
Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc.'4 In L'Aiglon Apparel, the Third
Circuit held that section 44(b) does not "create a federal law of unfair
competition available to United States citizens one against the other
nor does it grant the federal courts any new authority to hear such
controversies between citizens."' 145 Additionally, it contended that
had Congress intended to create a federal common law, Congress
would have enacted a provision that explicitly stated such intention. 14 6
The Third Circuit correctly concluded that section 44 applied only
in cases involving treaty nations' citizens and thus did not create a new
trademark law between American citizens. 47 This is the extent of
138. Under the reciprocal rights approach, citizens of signatory nations have the
same rights as those afforded to American citizens under section 43(a).
139. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir.
1956) (adopting the reciprocal rights approach); see also infra Part III.A (discussing
these cases).
140. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp.
684, 687-90 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (adopting the substantive rights approach); see also
infra Part III.B (discussing these cases).
141. See Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 687-88.
142. 234 F.2d 633.
143. See id. at 640-41.
144. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
145. See id. at 652.
146. See id. at 649.
147. See id. at 653.
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L'Aiglon Apparel holding. Although the Third Circuit did not
consider whether section 44 incorporates the broad substantive
prohibitions against unfair competition of Article lObis in cases
involving citizens of other member nations, other courts have
interpreted L'Aiglon Apparel as implying that section 44 should be
restricted to granting only reciprocal rights to foreigners"s In fact,
however, the Third Circuit stated only that section 44 applied in those
cases involving Convention nations' citizens. It contended that
section 44(i) affords protection to American citizens equal to that
afforded to foreigners by treaty:
This [section 44] is reasonably construed as comprehending not merely the
national identification of beneficiaries of the legislation but also the limiting
context in which rights are conferred upon them. That context is stated
explicitly in the words, 'to the extent and under the conditions essential to
give effect to any such conventions and treaties', as they appear near the
end of [section 44(b)]. If the foregoing analysis is correct, the federal rights
conferred in [section 44(i) to citizens are limited] in a way which obviously
excludes the ordinary domestic controversy such as we have here.
149
Thus, the Third Circuit concluded merely that section 44 could not be
used to afford protection in a dispute between two American
parties.150
Additionally, this analysis does not indicate whether the Third
Circuit construed section 44 as affording only reciprocal rights. In
fact, the analysis states that each treaty should be examined on a case-
by-case basis to determine "the extent and under the conditions
essential to give effect to any such conventions and treaties .... ,,5
Arguably, this implies that section 44 could give substantive effect to a
treaty. Nevertheless, L'Aiglon Apparel did not discuss the Paris
Convention or conclude that section 44 grants only reciprocal rights,
the case is still considered as adopting the Vanity Fair approach.
While the Third Circuit in L'Aiglon Apparel focused on Congress's
lack of intent to create a new federal trademark law, other courts have
relied primarily on the national treatment espoused by parts of the
Paris Convention.5 "National treatment" requires that each member
nation grant nationals of other member nations the same rights and
protections as such country affords to its own citizens.153 Thus, "[t]he
substantive standards of protection and the procedures for effecting
148. See, eg., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir.
1956) (discussing L'Aiglon Apparel and section 44).
149. See id at 652-53.
150. See id-
151. See id. at 653.
152. See eg., Paris Convention, supra note 5, art. 3 (requiring that citizens of
member nations domiciled in another member nation must be treated similar to the
nationals of the other nation).
153. See Samuel K. Murumba, Globalizing Intellectual Property: Linkage and the
Challenge of a Justice-Constituency, 19 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L., 435, 438 (1998).
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that protection [are], largely, left to the autonomy of each member
state."'-"
In Vanity Fair, the Second Circuit invoked a national treatment
analysis to restrict section 44's reach.155  Vanity Fair, an American
company, brought suit against T. Eaton, a Canadian company, in the
United States, alleging that T. Eaton had infringed the plaintiff's
trademark when the defendant sold goods under the "Vanity Fair"
label in Canada.15 6 The Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiff did
not have a claim based on any American statutory law. 157 It also held
that the Paris Convention did not allow extra-territorial application of
the laws of signatory nations.158 The Second Circuit concluded that
any trademark protection afforded to a company had its source in the
law of the jurisdiction in which the alleged unfair competition took
place.159  It then interpreted the Convention as a mere compact
between signatory nations to afford the same protections to each
other's citizens as to their own citizens, and section 44 of the Lanham
Act as only affording reciprocal rights.160
This holding was based on one purpose of the Paris Convention: to
afford national treatment to signatory nations' citizens.1 61 The Second
Circuit did not even attempt to consider another purpose of the
Convention: to assure a substantive minimum level of protection
against certain acts, including unfair competition. 62 An examination
154. Id.
155. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1956).
156. See id. at 637-38. Although the alleged actions took place outside of the
United States, the United States may have jurisdiction so long as there is an effect on
United States commerce. In U.S. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), the
Supreme Court upheld a Fifth Circuit decision that enjoined a Texan citizen from
manufacturing watches in Mexico with the Bulova trademark. See id. at 289. The
Supreme Court held actions deemed unlawful in the United States are not immune
from American law simply because the acts took place outside of the United States so
long as the acts have an effect on United States commerce. See id. at 288. Vanity Fair
interpreted Bulova as stating that the defendant's actions must have a substantial
effect on United States commerce to give the United Sates federal jurisdiction over
the claim. See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642-43.
157. See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 647-48. The Vanity Fair court reasoned that the
Paris Convention is a compact between the signatory nations. See id. at 643.
Accordingly, each country is a contracting party promising to protect citizens of other
member nations from unfair competition. The underlying theory of these promises is
that each country will afford such foreign citizens the same treatment under its laws as
it affords its own citizens. Consequently, such protection has its source in the law of
that country, not in the Convention. See id. at 640-41.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 641. Thus, the court concluded that Canada was the forum for this
dispute. See id.
160. See id. at 643. The court indicated that only a treaty relying on section 44 for
implementation could not afford substantive rights because section 44 could only
afford reciprocal rights. See id.
161. See id. at 642.
162. See Christopher D. DeCluitt, International Patent Prosecution, Litigation and
Enforcement, 5 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 135, 143 (1997).
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of all of the purposes and a detailed analysis of the intent behind the
Paris Convention would have been worthwhile since the Second
Circuit applied its holding to the entire Convention. Unfortunately,
while the Second Circuit limited its analysis to examining one purpose
of the Convention, it applied its conclusions to the Convention as a
whole. Consequently, the Second Circuit declared the Paris
Convention as based entirely on reciprocal rights rather than limiting
its holding to the provisions it had actually analyzed."
The Second Circuit could not limit its holding to the specific
provisions analyzed because the court did not analyze any specific
provisions. In fact, prior to determining that the Convention was a
reciprocal rights doctrine, it did not even examine the intent behind
the Paris Convention. 64 Without discussing the history of the
Convention or examining any specific provisions, the Second Circuit
merely stated that the Paris Convention is "essentially a compact
between the various member countries to accord in their own
countries to citizens of the other contracting parties trade-mark and
other rights comparable to those accorded their own citizens by their
domestic law.""6 Based on this assumption, it then stated that the
Convention did not afford extra-territorial application of a country's
laws. 16 While the Second Circuit correctly concluded that the
Convention did not afford extra-territorial application of a country's
laws, it did not consider another issue: whether the Convention
created a law unique from that of all member countries. Because this
case should have been tried in Canada, this incomplete analysis did
not necessarily result in the wrong conclusion. Nonetheless, other
courts chose to follow this holding without a critical analysis and thus
potentially may have resolved the disputes before such courts
incorrectly. 67
Recently, after examining whether section 44 substantively
incorporates treaties, several courts adopted the Vanity Fair
approach. 68 In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp.,'69 Eli Lilly, a
pharmaceutical company, claimed that Roussel engaged in unfair
competition by filing an application with the Food & Drug
Administration ("FDA") that contained false and misleading
163. See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642.
164. See id. at 641-42.
165. See id. at 640.
166. See id.
167. See e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460, 481-82 (D.NJ.
1998) (summarizing the two sides of the Article 10bis debate without an extensive
analysis).
16. See Piccoli v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 157, 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1998);
Eli Lilly & Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d. at 482.
169. 23 F. Supp. 2d 460.
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information to gain FDA approval of the drug, Cefaclor.170 Eli Lilly
argued that it was entitled to relief under section 44(h) of the Lanham
Act due to this misrepresentation. 171 The court held that section 44
does not permit an American plaintiff to bring a suit against a
foreigner for acts that are not actionable under American law.172
Eli Lilly did not add any new arguments to bolster the reciprocal
rights approach. Instead, the court merely summed up the two sides
and elected to follow the Vanity Fair interpretation. 3 Similar to
Vanity Fair, the court reasoned that because the Paris Convention was
a compact between signatory nations, each country promised only to
afford reciprocal rights to foreigners.174 Thus, domestic protection
from unfair competition is provided by section 43(a), not by Article
10bis. Furthermore, because American law did not allow a plaintiff to
bring such a suit, the court concluded that this count must be
dismissed. 75
While most courts have focused on the national treatment argument
as the basis for their conclusions about the Paris Convention, there is
an additional factor underlying courts' refusal to adopt a substantive
approach of the Paris Convention. For example, the incorporation of
the Paris Convention's substantive prohibitions against unfair
competition into American law may render section 1338(b) of the
Judicial Code superfluous.176  Section 1338(b) grants original
jurisdiction in ".any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition
when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright,
patent or trade-mark laws." 177 Thus, if the Lanham Act were
interpreted as enacting a general unfair competition law, this would
render section 1338(b) superfluous because the only cases that would
not fall under the federal law would be those not affecting interstate
commerce. 178  The Third Circuit in L'Aiglon Apparel used this
argument to assert that section 44 did not incorporate a new federal
trademark law between Americans. 179 The Third Circuit concluded
that section 1338(b) was rendered superfluous only in a dispute
between two Americans; it did not consider whether its conclusion
170. See id. at 467-68.
171. See id. at 481.
172. See id. at 482.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. The court also dismissed a section 43(a) claim because the court
concluded that the false representation argument attempted to stretch the reach of
section 43(a) too far and because another act, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act, which did not grant a private right of claim, would be more applicable to the
presented facts. See id. at 476-78.
176. See Callmann, supra note 79, § 2.06.
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1994).
178. See Callmann, supra note 79, § 2.06.
179. See L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 654 (3rd Cir.
1954).
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changed if a foreign party were involved."
Because the substantive prohibitions of the Paris Convention
should apply only in international disputes, not in disputes arising
solely between American parties, section 1338(b) would not be
rendered superfluous. Section 1338(b) would still apply in any suits
between Americans. However, in order not to render section 1338(b)
superfluous, the protections afforded against unfair competition
depend on the parties involved. Thus, the Paris Convention would
afford Americans greater protection from unfair competition by
foreigners than from fellow Americans. sn Because this Note contends
that Article 10bis is substantive, this disparity would exist under the
approach adopted by this Note. Unfortunately, to give full effect to
all statutory and treaty provisions, this disparity must exist.'
While all courts using the Vanity Fair approach have based their
decisions on one of the three aforementioned factors,'3 these courts
have not delved deeply into the treaty language itself. Most courts
adopting this approach have briefly considered the issue under the
national treatment analysis, before concluding that the Paris
Convention affords only reciprocal rights.18 The courts' analyses
180. See id.
181. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460,482 (D.NJ. 1998).
182. For a discussion attempting to resolve this disparity, see infra notes 264-66 and
accompanying text.
183. These factors are: (1) the creation of a new federal trademark law; (2)
adoption of the national treatment analysis of the Paris Convention; and (3) the
rendering of section 1338 as almost always superfluous.
184. Other courts have also determined that section 44 does not substantively
adopt the Paris Convention. See e.g., Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs,
Inc., 269 F.2d 375, 388 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that the Paris Convention only creates
"broad basic principles under which the laws of the [signatory nations] would
follow"); Piccoli v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 157, 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (holding that the Paris Convention is based on reciprocal rights); Mattel, Inc. v.
MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (adopting the Vanity
Fair approach); Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594,595 (4th
Cir. 1992) (concluding that any protections from unfair competition were afforded
under section 43(a)); Majorica, S.A. v. Majorca Int'l., Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 92, 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the Paris Convention does not afford extra-territorial
application of a country's laws).
In 1988, the Southern District of New York followed the Vanity Fair analysis. See
Majorica, 687 F. Supp. at 95. The court held that when a Spanish plaintiff sued an
American corporation, the plaintiff was not entitled to apply Spanish law under the
Paris Convention. See id. at 95. The court reasoned that signatory nations contracted
only to afford the same protection to citizens of other signatory nations as they do to
their own citizens. See hi. at 95-96.
In Majorica, the plaintiff was attempting to apply Spanish law, not to have the
Convention's definition applied through section 44. See id. Since the Convention
does not purport to effect the extra-territorial application of any country's laws, this
case should not have been decided under the Paris Convention's definition. See id.
Thus, the court was correct to conclude that the plaintiff's use of the Paris Convention
and section 44 was erroneous. See id. Similar to Vanity Fair, however, Majorica
misinterpreted the policies behind section 44 and the Paris Convention in reaching its
conclusion that the Paris Convention only afforded reciprocal rights. See supra notes
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exemplify their hesitation to view a treaty as equal to other forms of
American law. 85 Instead of seriously attempting to analyze the intent
behind the treaty,"8 these courts preferred to give effect to statutory
law.18  Thus, these courts may have caused the United States to
breach a treaty.
B. The Lopez Approach
The alternative to the reciprocal rights approach is a substantive
rights approach typified by General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de
Arriortua.11 Currently, only Lopez has examined the Paris
Convention under this approach. While other cases are deemed to
have adopted the Lopez approach, these courts have actually
determined only that section 44 can incorporate substantive
provisions of treaties.189  These courts, however, have not declared
that the Paris Convention affords substantive rights. Thus, the
primary focus of this part will be the Lopez case.
In Lopez, the court held that section 44 of the Lanham Act
incorporates the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention into
American law, including the broad prohibition against unfair
competition.19 To justify this approach, the court relied on the
following factors: (1) the purpose of the Lanham Act to provide rights
as stipulated by treaties and conventions; (2) the rendering of section
155-65 and accompanying text (analyzing Vanity Fair).
Before deciding to follow a modified Vanity Fair approach, the Fourth Circuit
briefly analyzed the two approaches interpreting the Paris Convention. In Scotch
Whisky Ass'n v. Majestic Distilling Co., Scotch Whisky sued Majestic alleging unfair
competition. See 958 F.2d at 595. Scotch Whisky claimed that Majestic's trademark
would deceive customers into believing that Majestic's whisky was distilled in
Scotland. See id. at 596. "'Whisky' spelled without an 'e' is commonly used to refer to
whisky distilled in Scotland, whereas 'whiskey' is used to refer to whiskey distilled in
the United States or Ireland." Id at 595 n.1. Thus, Scotch Whisky claimed that it was
entitled to protection from unfair competition as defined in the Paris Convention. See
id. at 596-97. The Fourth Circuit agreed with Scotch Whisky that the Paris
Convention prohibits unfair competition. See id. at 597. However, the court held that
section 44(b) only conferred the substantive rights needed to give effect to the
Convention. See id Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit stated that because this was a
trademark protection question, and not an unfair competition question, foreigners
were afforded no greater rights than those stated in section 43(a). See id. The court
concluded that to grant protection under Article 10bis would change it from applying
only to unfair competition to also applying to general trademark law infringements.
See id.
185. See Wolf, supra note 82, at 34; see also supra Part II.A (discussing
implementation of treaties in the United States).
186. While the Vanity Fair court discussed the intent behind the Paris Convention,
its actual analysis is quite brief. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d
633, 641-43 (2d. Cir. 1956).
187. See Bederman, supra note 97, at 954.
188. 948 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
189. See infra note 205 (setting forth court holdings on section 44).
190. See Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 689.
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44(i) of the Lanham Act as superfluous; and (3) the language of
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.
General Motors brought suit alleging that while Lopez was working
at General Motors as a high-level executive, he agreed to leave and
join Volkswagen, a German company. 9' General Motors also alleged
that Lopez agreed to take trade secrets and confidential business
plans with him.'92 As a result, the plaintiff's suit included an alleged
violation of the Paris Convention through section 44 of the Lanham
Act.19' After an analysis of the current law regarding whether section
44 incorporates the substantive provisions of treaties, the court
determined that the Lanham Act does incorporate Article 10bis.'94
Similar to other courts' reluctance to interpret treaties, the Lopez
court analyzed the Paris Convention through an examination of
American statutory law. 95 It stated that signatory nations promised to
protect individuals from the unfair competition set forth in Article
10bis.196 The court determined that the Paris Convention affords
substantive protections against unfair competition because section 44
was drafted to implement the treaty.' 91 In fact, a previous draft would
have included explicit protections against unfair competition similar
to those defined in the Paris Convention.'9" In the end, section 44(h)
incorporated the phrase "effective protection from unfair
competition." 99 This phrase was adopted from the Paris Convention
evidencing the belief that while American statutory law affords
narrower protection in section 43(a) than the Convention does, the
191. See id. at 686.
192- See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 687-89.
195. See id. at 689-90.
196. See id. at 689.
197. See id. Other courts have also considered whether section 44 incorporates
substantive provisions of treaties, without reaching a consensus. See, eg., In re
Lyndale Farm, 186 F.2d 723, 726 (CPA 1951) (stating in dictum that section 44(b) was
enacted in order to give full effect to conventions or treaties); Kemart Corp. v.
Printing Arts Research Labs, Inc., 269 F.2d 375, 389 (9th Cir. 1952) (concluding that
the "Paris Convention was not intended to define the substantive law in the area of
'unfair competition' of the signatory nations, but rather to set out the broad basic
principles under which the laws of the said countries would operate"); Toho Co. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co, 645 F.2d 788, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a Japanese
plaintiff was entitled to bring actions against an American defendant that were
permitted by the substantive provisions of the treaty); Maison Lazard et Compagnie
v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1286,1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding,
contrary to the Vanity Fair decision, that the Lanham Act incorporates the Paris
Convention's provisions); Majorica, S.A. v. Majorca Int'l, Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 92, 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (concluding that the practical effect of section 44 was to provide a
forum for a foreign plaintiff, but stopping short of explicitly indicating that section 44
provides a forum for substantive rights under a treaty).
19& See Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 690. The term "unfair competition" would have
"included all types of artificial interference with trade, including disparagement [and]




United States planned to give effect to the substantive provisions of
the Convention through section 44.
Additionally, because the Lanham Act states that "the intent of this
chapter is... to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and
[conventions,]" z 0 the court concluded that the "express purpose" of
the Lanham Act dictates incorporation of the substantive provisions
of the Paris Convention.20 1 It reasoned that because Congress
incorporated section 44(i) to give American citizens the same rights as
foreigners under treaties, Congress foresaw that treaties might expand
the laws of the United States.202 Furthermore, the court noted that the
Supreme Court has held that courts must give effect to every word in
a statute, and avoid rendering certain language superfluous.0 3
Consequently, the court contended that if section 44 is read to grant
foreigners only the rights afforded to American citizens, it renders
section 44(i) superfluous. 4
Curiously, while the court carefully analyzed Congress's intent
when enacting the Lanham Act, it barely examined the signatory
nations' intent behind both the Paris Convention as a whole and
specifically behind Article 10bis. Thus, this approach also exemplifies
courts' reluctance to interpret a treaty in order to determine its effect
on American law.205
IV. THE PROPOSED STANDARD: GIVING FULL EFFECT TO ARTICLE
10bis
After examining Article lObis of the Paris Convention, it is clear
that the objective behind this provision was to create substantive
protection against unfair competition.2° If member nations had stated
only that countries must protect other member nations' citizens from
unfair competition, but did not also create a minimum standard of
unfair competition to protect against, then the countries would have
agreed only to assure reciprocal rights. Under this theory of national
treatment, the basic rule of the Convention would have been that all
member nations would guarantee that citizens of all other signatory
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
201. See Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 689. The court also stated that its holding was
limited to the facts of the case. Thus, because this holding applies only between an
American party and foreign party, the diversity jurisdiction requirements under
section 1338(b) would not be eliminated. See id. at 690 n.5.
202. See id. at 689.
203. See id. (citing Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs v. Goudy,
777 F.2d 1122, 1127 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Mensache, 348 U.S. 528
(1955))).
204. See Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 689. Section 44(i) affords American citizens in
litigation with any foreign parties any extra protections that may have been afforded
to such foreigners through treaties. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1994).
205. See Wolf, supra note 82, at 34; see also supra notes 94-101 and accompanying
text (discussing courts' reluctance to uphold a treaty over statutory law).
206. See Callmann, supra note 79, §§ 2.06,26.10.
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nations shall enjoy the same rights and laws for the protection of their
property as the citizens of the nation in which the unfair competition
occurs.' Instead, Article 10bis includes both a provision defining
unfair competition and a requirement that each nation assure effective
protection against unfair competition to the citizens of all other
signatory nations."' Additionally, if a nation grants more protection
than that which is afforded by Article lObis, the Paris Convention
then demands the same treatment for citizens of other signatory
nations through reciprocal rights. Thus, while Article lObis creates a
minimum standard of substantive law that all signatory nations agreed
to uphold, the Article is also a reciprocal rights provision?
While the American law of unfair competition has broadened to
include tortious acts other than "passing off," the Lanham Act still
affords less protection than that afforded by the Convention. Thus,
the Paris Convention is a substantive provision in the United States.
Specifically, the Paris Convention affords broader protection than
does section 43(a) because the Convention includes prohibitions
against "all types of artificial interference with trade, including
disparagement [and] trade bribery.. .. ,0 This use of broader and
more European definitions of unfair competition in Article lObis
tends to evidence the belief that the Convention should be
substantively read to include these broader definitions?" Thus,
because section 43(a) affords narrower protection, the section does
not afford member nations' citizens the protections set forth in the
Paris Convention?12
Section 44, however, fills this gap because it fully incorporates the
doctrine of any convention or treaty to which the United States is a
signatory nation?13 While section 44 does not explicitly state that it
implements substantive provisions of treaties, its legislative history
reveals that Congress realized that treaties involving trademark lav
may change the substantive laws of this nation."4 In fact, Congress
stated: "We have the curious anomaly of this Government giving by
treaty and by law with respect to trade-marks and unfair competition
to nationals of foreign governments greater rights than it gives its own
citizens." '215 Additionally, the phrase "effective protection against
207. See Bodenhausen, supra note 5, at 12.
208. See McCarthy, supra note 8, § 29:25.
209. See supra Part II.B (analyzing Article 10bis).
210. See General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684,
690 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
211. See Bodenhausen, supra note 5, at 7.
212. See supra notes 126-28.
213. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1994).
214. See Derenberg, supra note 34, at 1037-39; see also supra notes 79-81
(discussing section 44's legislative history).
215. Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 689 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the
Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 164 (1939)).
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unfair competition" in section 44 was first used by the drafters of
Article 10bis.216 Thus, the adoption of these specific words evidences
the conclusion that section 44 was intended to substantively
implement the Paris Convention.
Although the Paris Convention sets the standard of protection that
member nations must afford to citizens of other member nations, the
Convention does not afford the protections of the Convention to
member nations' citizens within their own borders. Section 44 of the
Lanham Act, again, is the provision that gives effect to the
Convention for United States citizens. 17 First, section 44 assures that
citizens of signatory nations will receive the protections afforded
under the Paris Convention.18 Then, section 44(i) affords the same
protection to Americans in order "to put the citizen on equality with
the foreigner. 219
Section 44 does not apply to all suits. It only applies to suits
involving at least one foreignern As a result, section 44 causes a
disparity of rights in the United States because an American party has
more protection against a foreign party than the American has against
a fellow American." Courts under the Vanity Fair approach
depended upon this disparity when interpreting the Convention.'
Although Congress probably did not purposely intend to grant more
rights to American citizens against foreigners than as against each
other, this unequal treatment is the correct result if all sections of the
Lanham Act are correctly interpreted.
Even if section 44 does not explicitly state that it does not apply in
cases involving only Americans, the intent of Congress was to ensure
that foreigners did not have more protection against Americans than
Americans did against them.? Furthermore, to give effect to section
43(a) of the Lanham Act and section 1338(b) of the Judicial Code, 24
section 44 must be read to create this disparity.? Thus, because
section 43(a) affords less protection against unfair competition than
does Article 10bis, unequal protection exists for American plaintiffs
depending on whom they sue.
Due to the reluctance of American courts to view treaties as equal
216. See Wolf, supra note 82, at 42.
217. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(i).
218. See id. § 1126(h).
219. See Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 689 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before
Subcomm. On Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong 164 (1939)).
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1126.
221. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460,468 (D.N.J. 1998).
222. Id.
223. See Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 689 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the
Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 164 (1939)).
224. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1994); see also supra notes 175-82 (analyzing section
1338(b).
225. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
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to American statutory law,2-6 many courts misinterpreted section 44 as
only affording reciprocal rights in order to give greater effect to the
domestic statutory law of section 43(a).2 For example, courts under
both the Vanity Fair reciprocal rights approach and the Lopez
substantive rights approach did not analyze the Convention with the
same vigor with which they analyzed the applicable statutory law.2
"This... reluctance to view international conventions as the source of
significant domestic rights explains why sections 44(h) and (i) have
not been accorded greater attention ... ."m Thus, while section 44
has the ability to implement substantive provisions in treaties, many
courts have either misconstrued the intent behind section 44 or behind
a treaty to downplay the role of the treaty in American law.m
Additionally, the more intensive analysis of statutes by the judiciary
further illustrates courts' reluctance to view treaties as equal to
statutory law?' Even courts that find in favor of a treaty's substantive
provisions will often weight American statutory language more
heavily in their analysis. This uneven analysis is typified by General
Motors v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua.m While the court held that the
Paris Convention is indeed a substantive rights treaty, it weighted the
Lanham Act more heavily than the Paris Convention in its
determinationP 3 In fact, the Lopez court primarily examined the
legislative history of section 44 to determine whether the Paris
Convention afforded substantive protectionsP' Although the court
did examine the Paris Convention, its emphasis on section 44 is
characteristic of a court's reluctance to analyze a treaty with the same
enthusiasm with which it analyzes a statute.
Courts' reluctance to view treaties as equal to statutory law has
caused many courts to misinterpret the Paris Convention. For
example, some courts have incorrectly interpreted the Paris
Convention to hold that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is the
provision governing all suits involving unfair competition in the
federal courtsP 5 As noted above, while the reciprocal rights approach
maintains a uniform standard of unfair competition law within the
United States, it is in direct conflict with the promise of the United
States to uphold the unfair competition standard set forth in Article
226. See Wolf, supra note 82, at 33.
227. See Bederman, supra note 97, at 953; Wolf, supra note 82, at 34; Part IfI.A.
228 See e.g., Lopez, 948 F. Supp. at 687 (briefly analyzing Paris Convention);
Vanity Fairs Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641-43 (2d Cir. 1956) (analyzing
both the Paris Convention and the Lanham Act).
229. Wolf, supra note 82, at 34.
230. See supra part IlI.
231. See Wolf, supra note 82, at 42; see also supra notes 87-114 and accompanying
text.
232. 984 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
233. See id. at 687-89.
234. See id. at 689-90.
235. See supra Part M.A.
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10bis of the Paris Convention.
While the substantive rights approach gives effect to the substantive
provisions of the Paris Convention and all statutory law, this approach
results in a disparity of rights.z6 Consequently, this Note contends
that to eliminate this disparity and not breach the Paris Convention,
the United States should adopt Article 10bis's definition of unfair
competition as the definition for all suits in the United States, even
those between United States citizens. Congress should adopt a
broader law of unfair competition that would create a unitary
standard applied to Americans and foreigners alike in American
courts. This approach would then erase the disparity between the
protections from unfair competition afforded to an American plaintiff
against an American defendant under section 43(a), and those
afforded against a foreign defendant under Article lObis.
This Note's advocacy of international trademark law harmonization
is analogous to the argument for uniformity in nationwide trademark
protection that created the Lanham Act in 1946.23 The rise in
international commerce has created the need for worldwide uniform
protection similar to the need for a nationally coherent trademark law
due to the rise in interstate commerce during the first half of this
century.238 As countries become increasingly interdependent, unitary
standards, such as the Paris Convention, will gain in importance. Thus,
Congress should adopt either the Paris Convention's broad definition
of unfair competition as its own, or create a similar uniform protection
that would give effect to Article lObis's substantive protection against
unfair competition, thus erasing the disparity of rights in American
unfair competition law.
CONCLUSION
The law of unfair competition in the United States has its source in
both national and international doctrines. Along with other signatory
nations, the United States promised to protect against the standard of
unfair competition adopted in the Paris Convention. Consequently,
courts using Vanity Fair's reciprocal rights approach are not giving full
effect to the treaty. On the other hand, the Lopez court has taken the
opposite view and has found that the Paris Convention's substantive
prohibitions against unfair competition are incorporated into
American law. By adopting this approach, this court has given effect
to all statutory language, including section 44 and Article iObis.
The intent behind Article 10bis of the Paris Convention was to lay
the foundation for a unitary standard of protection against unfair
competition. As the world becomes ever more connected, the need
236. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
238. See Port, supra note 16, at 34.
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for such a unitary standard that all trademark owners can depend
upon is urgent. By affording trademark owners in signatory nations
the substantive protections accorded by Article lObis, courts will
simultaneously aid the United States in upholding its promise to
enforce the uniform standard set forth by the Paris Convention and
create a higher degree of confidence in the worldwide market among
trademark owners by upholding this unitary standard.
Even if courts upheld the rights and aided in the development of a
uniform global law, the United States's unfair competition law will
suffer from a disparity of rights within its own borders because the
Lanham Act creates two different laws depending on the parties. If
the parties in an unfair competition suit are both American, the suit is
decided under section 43(a). In contrast, if the suit is between an
American and a foreigner, the suit may be decided under Article
10bis. To erase this disparity and uphold its treaty obligations,
Congress should adopt Article lObis's definition for all unfair
competition, not just for disputes arising between an American and a
foreigner. As more unfair competition cases involving foreign parties
are decided in the United States, this disparity of protections afforded
to parties under Article 10bis versus section 43(a) in the United States
will only worsen if it is not alleviated. Just as Congress once saw the
need to create a federal standard of trademark law within the United
States, the time has now come for Congress to conform United States
unfair competition law to that of the rest of the world.
Notes & Observations
